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THE AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES 

I. INTRODUCTION 
A peremptory challenge is a challenge exercised by an attor­
ney to exclude a potential juror from the jury panel. There is no 
requirement that the attorney explain or justify a peremptory chal­
lenge, and no judicial determination is made as to its validity or 
sufficiency.1 Due to the discretionary nature of the peremptory 
challenge, it has been the subject of much abuse by prosecutors 
desiring to secure a potentially "conviction-biased" jury panel. 2 
Prosecutors have employed the peremptory challenge as a device 
to exclude members of a cognizable societal group3 from a petit 
jury solely on the basis of that group membership. In particular, 
prosecutors have sought to eliminate those individuals with the 
1. A challenge for cause, unlike a peremptory challenge, requires the attorney 
to give a specific reason, within statutory guidelines, for excluding a potential juror. 
The challenge is subject to judicial approval. Typically, statutes providing grounds 
for removal for cause permit exclusion of a juror who is related to a party to the liti­
gation, who has special knowledge of or previous participation in the case, or whose 
state of mind would prevent impartial action. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 
1071-1076 (West 1970); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 1971). In con­
trast, a peremptory challenge, often referred to as a peremptory, requires no justifica­
tion or judicial approval prior to its use. Except for statutory limitations on the num­
ber of peremptories, the exercise is essentially uncontrolled. In Swain v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Supreme Court characterized peremptory challenges as 
those exercised "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject 
to the court's control." Id. at 220. 
2. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276, 583 P.2d 748, 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. 
890, 902 (1978). For a discussion of some of the cases where prosecutors have pur­
posefully excluded prospective jurors in hopes of securing "conviction-biased" ju­
ries, see J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 152-59 (1977). Van Dyke notes 
that "[pjeremptories have been subject to abuse from the time juries were first intro­
duced in England." Id. at 147. 
3. Essentially, a cognizable group is one readily identifiable and infused with a 
distinct set of attitudes and beliefs arising from a common perspective and life expe­
rience. For example, blacks are considered a cognizable group. See text accompa­
nying notes 64-69 infra for a discussion of standards for identifying a cognizable 
group. 
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same group affiliation as the defendant. 4 The motivation for such 
prosecutorial discrimination is the belief that jurors of the same 
group as the defendant will be biased in favor of acquittal. 5 The re­
sult is a jury panel which is often decidedly more homogeneous 
than the community at large. 6 
This comment will examine the scope of the peremptory chal­
lenge in criminal trials, the deliberate use of peremptory chal­
lenges in a discriminatory manner, and the existing and potential 
remedies for such abuse. The United States Supreme Court's long­
standing approach, set forth in Swain v. Alabama,7 will be dis­
cussed. The emerging alternatives to Swain, successfully utilized 
by defendants in state courts, then will be considered. 8 Finally, 
the potential impact of these alternatives on future attempts to in­
validate juries selected through the discretionary exercise of per­
emptory challenges will be explored. 
It will be shown that defendants in most of the United States 
presently have little hope of establishing a prima facie case of dis­
criminatory prosecutorial action in the exercise of peremptory chal­
lenges in any given case. This comment will suggest approaches 
which a defendant may successfully employ to assert a denial of his 
rights by a prosecutor who exercises the challenges granted to him 
against all, or almost all, members of a particular cognizable group. 
By following one of the approaches set forth in this comment, 
hopefully defendants will be able to better protect their rights to a 
fair trial by an impartial jury composed of a representative cross 
section of the community, unhampered by prosecutorial discrimi­
nation. 
4. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 155-56. It is important to note that the defendant 
need not be of the same group affiliation as the jurors peremptorily challenged to as­
sert a claim of violation of constitutional rights. In Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), 
the Supreme Court held that a white defendant had standing to assert his claim 
where no blacks had served on the grand jury that indicted him or on the petit jury 
that convicted him. Id. at 504-05. The Court stated: "[W]hen a grand or petit jury has 
been selected on an impermissible basis, the existence of a constitutional'violation 
does not depend upon the circumstances of the person making the claim." Id. at 498. 
5. United States v. Danzey, 476 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); J. VAN DYKE, 
supra note 2, at 152-54. 
6. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276, 583 P.2d 748, 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. 
890, 902 (1978). 
7. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
8. In particular, the decisions that will be discussed are: People v. Wheeler, 22 
Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 
(La. 1979); State v. Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361 (La. 1978); State v. Kelly, 362 So. 2d 
1071 (La. 1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499, 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). 
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In England, prior to 1305, the peremptory challenge was 
available to both the Crown and the defendant. 9 The Ordinance of 
Inquests, passed in that year, forbade the use of peremptories by 
the Crown because the previous grant of unlimited challenges had 
caused infinite delay.lO From this point on, criminal defendants 
were entitled to exercise a limited number of peremptory chal­
lenges whereas the government was allowed only challenges for 
cause.ll The rationale for providing the defendants with "an arbi­
trary and capricious species of challenge . . . without showing any 
cause at all"12 was to protect the defendant13 from jurors prej­
udiced either by the defense's inciteful questioning on voir dire14 
or by an unsuccessful attempt to challenge the juror for cause. IS 
No similar protection was available to the government because 
none was thought necessary. 
It was not until the nineteenth century that the government's 
interest in obtaining an impartial jury was recognized. 16 A certain 
number of peremptory challenges were allocated to enable the gov­
ernment to strike jurors who were unfairly biased against convic­
tion.17 
The development of the peremptory challenge in the United 
States paralleled the common-law development of the challenge. 
The First Congress followed the common-law practice of providing 
defendants alone with the right to exercise peremptory challenges 
to potential jurors. IS It was not until 1865 that the government was 
9. 33 Edw. I, Stat. 4 (1305). 
10. Id. 
11. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353. 
12. Id. 
13. Blackstone refers to the peremptory challenge as "a provision full of that 
tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous." 
Id. at 346. 
14. Id. at 353. Blackstone explained that 
sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive 
upon the bare looks and gestures of another ... [and] the law wills not that 
[the defendant] should be tried by anyone man against whom he has con­




16. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150. 
17. Commonwealth v. Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 621, 387 N.E.2d 499, 
513, cen. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). 
18. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 119 (current version at FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 24(b». 
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granted the right to exercise peremptory challenges in federal 
courtS. 19 The practice in state courts varied. 20 For example, New 
York did not allow the prosecutor to exercise any peremptory chal­
lenges until 1881. 21 Virginia did not grant prosecutors the right to 
exercise peremptories until 1919. 22 Today, however, the peremp­
tory challenge is provided for by statute throughout the United 
States. 23 It is available to both parties in the jury selection pro­
ceeding although the exact method of application varies by stat­
ute. 24 
III. SCOPE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
Although not constitutionally mandated,25 the peremptory 
challenge has long been recognized as an essential component of 
the right to a fair trial by jury.26 Peremptories provide a mecha­
nism for assuring the existence of an impartial jury in a given trial. 
It is hoped that both sides will exercise their peremptory chal­
lenges judiciously to eliminate the extremes of partiality and poten­
tial prejudice. The result is a jury composed of "impartial" commu­
nity members.27 
Despite the benefits to be derived from the exercise of per­
19. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 2, 13 Stat. 500 (current version at FED. R. 
CRlM. P. 24(b». 
20. See]. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 171-72 n.57, for a compilation of the 
dates when each state authorized the prosecutor to exercise peremptory challenges. 
21. Id. at 171 n.46. See also People v. Aichinson, 7 How. Pro 241 (N.Y. 1852). 
22. ]. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 171 n.46. 
23. See, e.g., FED. R. CRlM. P. 24(b); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 1970); 
N.Y. CRlM. PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1971). 
24. There are basically two methods by which challenges are exercised. Under 
the system most commonly used, prospective jurors are chosen from the venire and 
are then subject to challenges. Once a juror is peremptorily challenged, he is re­
placed by another prospective juror. The replacement is then subject to peremptory 
challenge if the attorney has additional challenges remaining. The struck jury system 
is an alternative approach used in some states. Its exact method of application varies. 
Generally, the attorneys exercise their challenges for cause first to achieve a venire 
the size of the final jury plus the number of peremptory challenges available to both 
sides. At this point, each side exercises its peremptories until the panel is down to 
the final size. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 146-47. The struck system is recognized 
as more manipulative since the attorneys have more of an opportunity to control the 
composition of the final panel. It was the struck system that was utilized in Alabama 
and upheld as nondiscriminatory in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 218. 
25. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). 
26. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894); Lewis v. United States, 
146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892). 
27. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 219; People V. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 274, 
583 P.2d 748, 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 901 (1978). 
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emptory challenges by both sides, peremptories also may be a tool 
for invidious discrimination by the prosecutor. By exercising his 
peremptory challenges to exclude all prospective jurors of a partic­
ular racial or ethnic group, the prosecutor can produce a jury panel 
that is not only demographically unbalanced,28 but is arguably 
more biased than the randomly selected jury panel. 29 In doing so, 
the prosecutor may be infringing upon the defendant's constitu­
tional protections of equal protection and fair trial by an impartial 
jury. 
IV. THE SWAIN LEGACY 
In Swain v. Alabama,30 the United States Supreme Court 
sanctioned the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to ex­
clude from the jury those black jurors remaining after challenges 
for cause were exercised. 31 The Court created a presumption that 
the prosecutor was using his peremptory challenges in a permissi­
ble manner to secure a fair and impartial jury in any given case. 32 
The Court went on to say, "The presumption is not overcome ... 
by [defendant's] allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes 
were removed from the jury or that they were removed because 
they were Negroes."33 
28. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276, 583 P.2d 748, 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. 
890, 902 (1978). 
29. ld. 
30. 380 U.S. at 202. In Swain, the black defendant challenged the prosecutor's ex­
ercise of his peremptories against every black venireman as violative of the defend­
ant's right to equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment: the exact 
·number 	so challenged was unclear. It should be noted that the sixth amendment 
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury had not yet been applied to the states. 
Whether the United States Supreme Court would have decided Swain differently 
had the sixth amendment been applicable is open to debate. In People v. Wheeler, 
22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978), the California Supreme 
Court suggested that the United States Supreme Court would have reached the same 
result. The California court perceived the underlying motivation for the Swain deci­
sion, preservation of the arbitrary nature of the peremptory system, to be equally ap­
plicable to the two constitutional provisions. ld. at 284-85, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. 
Rptr. at 908. This notion may be supported by the language of Swain. The United 
States Supreme Court stated: "[T1o subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particu­
lar case to the demands of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change 
in the natur~ and operation of the challenge." 380 U.S. at 221-22. The same objec­
tion, the California court argued, would presumably arise if the sixth amendment 
were invoked. 22 Cal. 3d at 284-85, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908. 
31. 380 U.S. at 227. 
32. ld. at 222. The Swain Court reviewed the history of peremptory challenges 
in England and the United States and then concluded that the use of peremptories 
in a given case must remain unquestionable. ld. at 212-22. 
33. ld. at 222. 
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The Court proceeded to set forth the burden a defendant 
would have to meet in order to establish a prima facie case of dis­
crimination. Essentially, the Swain standard gives presumptive 
propriety to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges in a 
given case.34 The defendant has the burden of establishing that the 
prosecutor has acted deliberately and systematically, in all types of 
cases, over an extended period of time, to exclude all members of 
a particular racial or ethnic group from all jury panels in the coun­
ty so that no members of the group ever serve on petit juries. 35 If 
the defendant meets this burden, then Swain suggests that the 
presumption would be overcome and that the defendant would be 
entitled to appropriate relief. 36 
The Swain burden has proved insurmountable;37 no defendant 
has been able to comply. Nevertheless, Swain remains the rule. 38 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 223-34. But see United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 
1971). In Pearson, the court said that it did "not read Swain as meaning that the at­
tack on the Government's use of its challenges must fail if the impermissible use is 
not exercised one hundred percent of the time." Id. at 1217. "The occasional service 
of a black as a petit juror ... does not negate purposeful and systematic exclusion 
over an extended period of time." State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, 1164 n.1 
(La. 1979). 
36. 380 U.S. at 224. The Court recognized that the peremptory system was not 
intended to "facilitate or justify" the use of challenges to deny blacks the "same 
right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice [as] ... the white 
population." Id. 
37. See Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14 (1977). The author states: "[N]o defendant has 
yet been successful in proving to the court's satisfaction an invidious discrimination 
by the use of the peremptory challenge against blacks over a period of time." Id. at 
24. But see United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974), in which 
the court granted the defendant a new trial "in the interest of justice" after the gov­
ernment had peremptorily challenged six black jurors. Id. at 1250. See also United 
States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971), in which the court ventured that the 
Swain burden, although never met, is not "insurmountable." Id. at 1218. 
In Swain, evidence that no black had served on a jury in the Alabama county in 
question in at least 15 years, if ever, was deemed insufficient evidence of systematic 
exclusion, and the prosecutor's actions were held not to be in error. 380 U.S. at 
225-26. 
38. Although the federal and state courts have consistently followed Swain, the 
decision has not been without serious detractors. Commentators have assailed its ef­
fect upon jury composition and decisionmaking. See Brown, McGuire, & Winters, 
The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional 
Use or Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 192 (1978); Comment, A Case Study of the Per­
emptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike At Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 662 (1974); Comment, The Prosecutor's Exercise of the Peremptory 
Challenge to Exclude Nonwhite Jurors: A Valued Common Law Privilege in Conflict 
with the Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 554 (1977); Comment, Swain 
v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 
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Federal and state courts faced with the task of evaluating 
prosecutorial exercise of peremptory challenges consistently rely on 
the Court's standard of proof as controlling, and the Supreme 
Court has refused recent requests to reconsider the issue. 39 
Defendants, however, have not been totally without remedy. 
Alternative methods of challenging a prosecutor's abusive exercise 
of peremptory challenges have emerged. Recently, in a series of 
decisions, judges have been sympathetic to defendants' pleas of 
discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors. 
Defendants have alleged and proved violations of state constitu­
tional provisions protecting the right to trial by a jury representa­
tive of a cross section of the community4° and the right to equal 
protection and human dignity.41 The approaches adopted by the 
highest state courts of California,42 Massachusetts,43 and Louisi­
44ana are important both for their points of departure from the 
Swain approach and for their attempts to justifY their decisions 
within the framework of the United States Constitution and recent 
Supreme Court holdings. 45 
V. THE WHEELER ALTERNATIVE 
In 1978, two black defendants in California successfully chal­
lenged the validity of guilty verdicts reached by an all-white jury 
that had been secured through the purposeful use of peremptory 
52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966); Note, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REv. 
103 (1965); Note, The jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 
HASTINGS L.J. 1417 (1969); Note, Peremptory Challenge-Systematic Exclusion of 
Prospective jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 MISS. L.J. 157 (1967); Note, People v. 
Wheeler: Peremptory Challenges-A New Interpretation, 14 NEW ENG. L. REv. 370 
(1978); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit 
juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977); Note, Fair jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 
322 (1965); 41 ALB. L. REV. 623 (1977). 
39. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in recent cases which have raised 
the issue. State v. Kelly, 362 So. 2d 1071 (La. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118 
(1979); Commonwealth V. Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State V. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 262 A.2d 868, cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 949 (1970). 
40. See text accompanying notes 51, 62 & 63 infra. 
41. See text accompanying notes 107 & 110 infra. 
42. People V. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). 
43. Commonwealth v. Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). 
44. State V. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979); State V. Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361 
(La. 1978) (concurring opinion); State v. Kelly, 362 So. 2d 1071 (La. 1978) (concur­
ring opinion). 
45. See note 76 infra for a discussion of the Supreme Court cases. 
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challenges by the prosecution to eliminate all potential black ju­
rors.46 In People v. Wheeler,47 the California Supreme Court held 
that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution48 and 
article I, section 16 of the California Constitution49 independently 
and equally guaranteed the "right to trial by a jury drawn from a 
representative cross-section of the community."5o When the prose­
cution uses peremptory challenges to exclude individuals from a 
particular jury panel solely on the basis of group affiliation, and 
bias presumed to emanate from this affiliation, the California con­
stitutional guarantee, at least, is offended. 51 Any jury so impan­
elled, or any verdict reached by such a panel, cannot stand. 52 
The Wheeler court set forth a method of evaluating 
prosecutorial action in light of a defendant's suspicion, in a particu­
lar case, of abuse. 53 In accord with Swain, an initial presumption of 
46. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 283, 583 P.2d 748, 766, 148 Cal. Rptr. 
890, 907 (1978). 
47. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). 
48. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[Tlhe 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury...." 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to trial by an impartial jury was held applicable to 
the states in 1968. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
49. Article I, § 16 of the California Constitution provides: "Trial by jury is an 
inviolate right and shall be secured to all ...." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
SO. 22 Cal. 3d at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. The represen­
tative cross section requirement was first applied by the courts in cases involving the 
systematic exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 
311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). The courts subsequently recognized other classes as worthy 
of protection: Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (women); Hernandez v. Texas, 
347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Chicanos); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) 
(wage earners). In 1970, the Supreme Court determined the right to a representative 
jury to be a component of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial. Williams v. 
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). 
51. 22 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. The 
California Supreme Court acknowledged that "Swain provides less protection to 
California residents than the rule" adopted in Wheeler. Id. at 285, 583 P.2d at 767, 
148 Cal. Rptr. at 908. The court cited two major difficulties with Swain: First, the 
defendant is required to show systematic exclusion over time so that an individual 
defendant is afforded no protection; and second, the necessary data and records 
needed to establish the proper record of systematic exclusion are essentially 
unobtainable. Id. at 285-86, 583 P.2d at 767-68, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09. 
52. Id. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. See text accompanying 
note 74 infra. 
53. Prior to setting forth its method of evaluating prosecutorial exercise of per­
emptory challenges, the Wheeler court rejected proposed methods based upon statis­
tical analysis of the voir dire. The approaches urged by the defendants and an 
amicus curiae would calculate the probability that the prosecutor intentionally exer­
cised his peremptories to eliminate a particular group from the jury for discrimina­
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prosecutorial propriety in the exercise of peremptory challenges ex­
ists. 54 At this point the approaches diverge. While Swain asserted 
that the presumption could be rebutted only by evidence of sys­
tematic exclusion over an extended period of time,55 the court in 
Wheeler declared that the presumption could be rebutted within 
the framework of a single case. 58 
The Wheeler court set forth a two-part test for defendants to 
apply in rebutting the presumption that the prosecutor exercised 
his peremptory challenges in a proper manner. The defendant 
must establish the two elements of this test to the satisfaction of 
the trial judge, by "as complete a record of the circumstances as is 
feasible.... "57 First, the defendant must show exclusion of mem­
bers of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representa­
tive cross-section rule. 58 Second, the defendant must demonstrate 
that there is a "strong likelihood" that the individuals were ex­
cluded on the basis of that group membership, rather than on the 
basis of a specific, individual bias. 59 Once a defendant makes out a 
prima facie case of constitutionally impermissible action, the bur­
den shifts to the prosecutor to justify his exercise of peremptory 
challenges on specific bias grounds. 
The Wheeler court explained both the scope of the representa­
tive cross-section rule and the distinction between group and spe­
cific bias. The court viewed the representative cross-section re­
quirement as an important prerequisite to obtaining an impartial 
jury.60 The interaction of diverse beliefs and inherent biases indi­
tory reasons. The Wheeler court noted that statistical theories of evaluating the 
venire have been adyocated by scholars and accepted by courts, but expressed con­
cern that statistics c~uld properly be utilized at the challenge stage ~f the proceed­
ings. 22 Cal. 3d at 278-80, 583 P.2d at 763-64, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904-05. The court 
chose instead to follow what it termed "more traditional procedures." See text ac­
companying notes 55-60 & 72-74 infra, for a discussion of the Wheeler approach. 
54. 22 Cal. 3d at 278, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904. The Wheeler court 
set forth three reasons for the presumption of prosecutorial propriety in the exercise 
of peremptory challenges: The presumption is consistent with the legislative intent 
underlying peremptories; it encourages the use of peremptories in appropriate cases; 
and it accords respect for attorneys as officers of the court. ld. at 278, 583 P.2d at 
762-63, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904. 
55. See notes 32 & 33 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Swain burden. 
56. 22 Cal. 3d at 285, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09. 
57. ld. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. 
58. ld. 
59. ld. 
60. ld. at 270, 583 P.2d at 757, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 898. 
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vidual jurors necessarily bring with them to the decisionmaking 
process was cited as critical to achieving an impartial jury.61 
[I]n our heterogeneous society jurors will inevitably belong to 
diverse and often overlapping groups defined by race, religion, 
ethnic or national origin, sex, age, education, occupation, eco­
nomic condition, place of residence, and political affiliation; ... 
it is unrealistic to expect jurors to be devoid of opinions, precon­
ceptions, or even deep-rooted biases derived from their life ex­
periences in such groups; [therefore] . . . the only practical way 
to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the representa­
tion of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the respective 
biases of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will 
tend to cancel each other out. 62 
When a juror is peremptorily challenged on the basis of group 
membership, and beliefs commonly associated with that member­
ship, "such interaction [of diverse beliefs and values] becomes im­
possible and the jury will be dominated by the conscious or uncon­
scious prejudices of the majority. "63 
The Wheeler court was vague as to what constituted a "cog­
nizable group," stating only that blacks constituted such a group. 64 
The California Supreme Court, however, has since had occasion to 
explore the meaning of "cognizable groups." In Rubio v. Superior 
Court of San Joaquin County,65 a defendant challenged the exclu­
sion of resident aliens from California's jury pools. The court set 
forth two requirements that must be met before a group will be 
considered cognizable within the meaning of the representative 
cross-section rule. 66 "First, its members must share a common 
perspective arising from their life experience in the group . . . 
[including] a common social or psychological outlook on human 
events. "67 Second, no other members of the community can be ca­
pable of adequately representing that common perspective so ex­
61. Id. at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896. 
62. [d. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth v. 
Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 617, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), 
pointed out that "[i)t is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consis­
tently vote as a class in order to conclude ... that its exclusion deprives the jury of a 
perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case 
...." Id. at 617-18, 387 N.E.2d at 512. 
63. 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. 
64. Id. at 280 n.26, 583 P.2d at 764 n.26, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905 n.26. 
65. 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979). 
66. Id. at 98, 593 P.2d at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737. 
67. Id. 
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cluded from the jury.68 When these two requirements are met, 
then exclusion of group members effectively impedes the desired 
mixture of community attitudes and beliefs that is the essence of 
the representative cross-section rule. 69 
To be considered impermissible, the prosecutor's peremptory 
challenges of members of a cognizable group must be based solely 
on the fact of group membership. The Wheeler court termed this 
"group bias. "70 The elimination of an individual who is a member 
of a cognizable group, however, would be permissible if based 
upon "specific bias." A specific bias is "a bias relating to the partic­
ular case on trial or the parties or witnesses thereto."71 
Under the Wheeler rationale, once a prima facie case of exclu­
sion is established, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to justifY his 
68. [d. 
69. 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. This definition of 
cognizable groups is applicable only in the California state court system. Other ap­
proaches to the meaning of the term are likely. In Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 
(1954), the United States Supreme Court stated that, in the past, race and color have 
been readily identifiable characteristics of groups needing the Court's protection. 
But community prejudices are not static, and from time to time other 
differences from the community norm may define other groups which need 
the same protection. Whether such a group exists within a community is a 
question of fact. When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and 
it is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that 
class for different treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the 
guarantees of the Constitution have been violated. 
Id. at 478. Thus, in Hernandez, the Supreme Court held that systematic exclusion of 
Mexican-Americans from service on grand and petit juries was a denial of equal pro­
tection to a defendant of Mexican descent. [d. at 482. 
In Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946), the Court said that "eco­
nomic, social, religious, racial, political, and geographical groups of the community" 
could not be excluded from jury service. Id. at 220. The Thiel court concluded that a 
system which resulted in exclusion of most wage earners from jury service was im­
permissible. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has chosen to define such groups in 
relation to the equal rights amendment adopted by the state legislature in 1976. 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 628, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516. Thus, 
peremptory challenges based solely upon "sex, race, color, creed, or national origin" 
would be impermissible. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. I. This is a broader definition than 
the one set forth by the California court in Rubio v. Superior Court of San Joaquin 
County, 24 Cal. 3d at 93, 593 P.2d at 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 734. In Rubio, exclusion 
of resident aliens from California's jury selection pools was upheld on the ground 
that, although the members might share common experiences, those experiences 
could be vicariously represented by other individuals eligible for jury service. Id.-at 
100, 593 P.2d at 599, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 738. Under the Massachusetts approach, exclu­
sion on the basis of national origin would be unconstitutional. 
70. 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. 
71. [d. 
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use of peremptories by showing that they were used in a 
nondiscriminatory fashion. The prosecutor must demonstrate to the 
satisfaction of the judge72 that the peremptories were exercised 
against members of a cognizable group on the basis of specific 
bias. 73 At this point, if the prosecutor is unable to make a showing 
of permissible use of the peremptory challenges, the jury already 
selected is dismissed, the entire jury pool is quashed, and jury se­
lection must begin anew. 74 
The uniqueness of the Wheeler approach stems from the ex­
tension of the representative cross-section requirement, previously 
applied only to the jury venire, to the composition of the jury 
panel itself. The Wheeler court based its extension of the rule to 
the jury panel upon a series of California7S and United States Su­
preme Court'6 decisions which did not expressly apply the rule be­
yond the jury selection stage. 
The extension of the right to a representative cross section to 
the composition of the actual jury panel is not illogical. The same 
concerns that give rise to the necessity for a variety of attitudes 
and beliefs on the jury venire are present in the final stage of se­
lection of an impartial jury, the impanelling of the actual jury. 77 
The Supreme Court, however, has not yet chosen to extend the 
representative cross-section requirement to petit jury composition. 
In Taylor v. Louisiana,78 the Supreme Court, in the course of 
identifying and applying the representative cross-section rule to the 
72. Id. at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. The showing of per­
missible use of the peremptory challenge against a particular juror need not meet the 
level of justification necessary to support a challenge for cause. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. [d. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. 
75. [d. at 270-72,583 P.2d at 757-58, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. The court dis­
cusses People v. White, 43 Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1945), in detail. In White, the 
California Supreme Court expressly recognized the requirement of "an impartial jury 
drawn from a cross-section of the entire community" as an essential component of 
the right to trial by an impartial jury. [d. at 754, 278 P.2d at 17. 
76. 22 Cal. 3d at 266-70,583 P.2d at 754-57, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896-98. The court 
traced a series of United States Supreme Court decisions from Smith v. Texas, 311 
U.S. 128 (1940) (systematic exclusion of blacks from grand jury service) to Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (systematic exclusion of women from jury service). 
The Wheeler court relied upon the Supreme Court's repeated emphasis that a petit 
jury should embody a representative cross section of the community, as proof of the 
importance of the representative cross-section rule in protecting the right to trial by 
impartial jury. 22 Cal. 3d at 270, 583 P.2d at 757, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 898. 
77. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 
3d at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896. 
78. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
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selection of the venire, specifically rejected any "requirement that 
petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect 
the various distinctive groups in the population. "79 The Wheeler 
court recognized the impracticability of such a mirror-image re­
quirement but refused to allow the final stage in the jury selection 
process, the challenges, to escape all representative require­
ments. 80 It is this extension of the requirement that defendants in 
other state courts may seize upon in attempting to challenge 
prosecutorial abuse of challenges. 
VI. POST-WHEELER: THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ApPROACH 
Challenging prosecutorial action by asserting a denial of a state 
constitutional right is a narrow approach to the problem. This 
method of attack cannot be used unless the state constitution pro­
vides appropriate protection. To date, the highest courts81 of 
79. [d. at 538. Later, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court 
again noted that "the fact that a particular jury ... does not statistically reflect the ra­
cial composition of the community does not in itself make out an invidious discrimi­
nation forbidden by the [Equal Protection] Clause." [d. at 239. Congress expressly 
rejected the mirror-image rule. Discussing the Jury Selection and Service Act of 
1968,28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869, 1871 (1976), which was passed to ensure that potential 
jurors will be selected randomly from a representative cross section of the commu­
nity, the House report states that the Act "does not require that at any stage beyond 
the initial source list the selection process shall produce groups that accurately mir­
ror community makeup." H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 
[1968] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1792,1794. 
Further, the report notes that the Act "leaves undisturbed the right of a litigant 
to exercise his peremptory challenges to eliminate jurors for purely subjective rea­
sons." [d. at 1795 (emphasis added). 
80. 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. 
81. Although the New York Court of Appeals has not decided the issue, one 
New York supreme court has considered whether the New York Constitution affords 
defendants the same protections that the California and Massachusetts courts delin­
eate in Wheeler and Soares. In People V. Kagan, 101 Misc. 2d 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987 
(Sup. Ct. 1979), a New York supreme court held that the use of peremptory chal­
lenges to exclude jurors "solely by reason of their sex, race, color, creed, or national 
origin," where that affiliation is the same as that of the defendant, is a deprivation of 
the right to trial by a jury of peers guaranteed by art. 1, § 1 of the New York Consti­
tution. [d. at 277, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 989. The court went on to find that there had been 
no violation of the rights of two Jewish defendants when a prosecutor used five of 
his six peremptory challenges to exclude from the jury individuals with surnames 
that the defendants claimed indicated affiliation with the Jewish faith. A subsequent 
judicial inquiry determined that in fact four of the five were Jewish. [d. at 277, 420 
N.Y.S.2d at 990. 
For an explanation of the California court's approach in Wheeler, see text accom­
panying notes 49-54,56-59 & 72-74 supra. 
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California,82 Massachusetts,83 Louisiana,84 and Delaware85 have 
shown at least some interest in affording defendants protection be­
yond Swain's limits. Other state courts, however, continue to ad­
here to Swain; the rights of defendants in these states to a fair trial 
unhampered by prosecutorial discrimination in the use of 
peremptories remains essentially unprotected. 86 
A. Massachusetts: Adopting the Wheeler Approach 
Commonwealth v. Soares 87 was the first post-Wheeler case 
to adopt the Wheeler approach. The Massachusetts Supreme Judi­
cial Court found that the state constitutional guarantee of a fair trial 
by an impartial jury, embodied in article XII of the Declaration of 
Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution,88 was violated by the 
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove twelve of the 
thirteen blacks on the venire. 89 Like the California Supreme Court 
82. 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. See notes 47-59 & 
70-74 supra and accompanying text. 
83. Commonwealth v. Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). 
84. State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979); State v. Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361 
(La. 1978); State v. Kelly, 362 So. 2d 1071 (La. 1978). 
85. Saunders v. State, 401 A.2d 629 (Del. 1979). The Delaware Supreme Court 
discussed the Wheeler mode of inquiry into the prosecutor's use of peremptory chal­
lenges, but rejected its application where only one black was called to the jury box 
and peremptorily challenged. The court stated that there was no indication of impro­
priety in this single instance. Id. at 632. The mention ofWheeler, however, may indi­
cate a willingness to follow its standard in future cases in the Delaware courts where 
a pattern cof abuse arises within a single jury selection proceeding. 
86. See, e.g., Watts v. State, 53 Ala. App. 518, 521, 301 So. 2d 280, 283 (Crim. 
App. 1974); State v. Simpson, 326 So. 2d 54, 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Jones v. 
State, 243 Ga. 820, 822, 256 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1979); State v. Stewart, 225 Kan. 410, 
416, 591 P.2d 166, 172 (1979); People v. Redwine, 50 Mich. App. 593, 596, 213 
N.W.2d 841, 843 (1973); State v. Baker, 524 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Mo. 1975); State v. 
Hatten, 561 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 483, 
262 A.2d 868, 871 (1970); Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289,296,336 A.2d 290, 
294 (1975); Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); State v. 
Salinas, 87 Wash. 2d 112, 116, 549 P.2d 712, 714 (1976); State v. Grady, 93 Wis. 2d 1, 
8,286 N.w.2d 607, 609 (1979). 
87. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). 
In People v. Allen, 23 Cal. 3d 286, 590 P.2d 30, 152 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1979), the 
California Supreme Court followed the approach it had set forth in Wheeler. Id. at 
289, 590 P.2d at 31, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 455-56. 
88. Article XII of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution 
provides for trial "by the judgment of [the defendant's] ... peers." MASS. CONST. 
pt. 1, art. XII. 
89. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 626-27,387 N.E.2d at 515-16. Although one black ju­
ror remained on the jury panel that tried and convicted the defendants in Soares, the 
court stated that this did not affect the holding: 
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in Wheeler, the court in Soares reviewed the representative cross­
section rule as applied by Massachusetts90 and the United States 
Supreme Court91 and concluded that "the right to be tried by a 
jury drawn fairly from a representative cross-section of the commu­
nitY is critical. "92 The exclusion of cognizable groups from a jury 
panel "deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that 
may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be pre­
sented. "93 Thus, the Massachusetts court stated that peremptories 
may be used only to challenge "prospective jurors whose unique 
relationship to the particular case raises the spectre of individual 
b ·las. "94 
The approach adopted by the Soares court for evaluating the 
actions of a prosecutor in a given case clearly is modeled after 
Wheeler. 95 The defendant must make a prima facie showing that 
the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to exclude individu­
als from the jury solely on the basis of group bias. The prosecutor 
must then come forward and justify the challenges on the basis of 
specific bias. 96 The Soares court specifically rejected the Swain ap­
proach, noting that the defendants were not predicating their 
claims of error upon a violation of the fourteenth amendment guar­
antee of equal protection and would have been unsuccessful before 
the court had they done so. The defendants would have had insuf­
ficient evidence of past practices to meet the extensive burden 
imposed by Swain. 97 
One need not eliminate 100% of minority jurors to achieve an impermissible 
purpose. If the minority's representation is reduced to 'impotence,' as for ex­
ample, by the challenge of a disproportionate number of group members, 
and the failure to challenge only a minority member who can reasonably be 
relied on as 'safe,' the majority identified biases are likely to meet little re­
sistance, and the representative cross-section requirement is not fulfilled. 
[d. at 627 n.32, 387 N.E.2d at 516 n.32. Cf. State v. Bias, 354 So. 2d 1330, 1331 (La. 
1978) (systematic exclusion can still be shown when token blacks are included over a 
period of time on juries). 
90. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 614, 387 N.E.2d at 510-11. 
91. [d. at 615-18, 387 N.E.2d at 511-12. 
92. [d. at 616, 387 N.E.2d at 511. 
93. [d. at 617-18, 387 N.E.2d at 512. 
94. [d. at 623,387 N.E.2d at 514. 
95. [d. at 629, 387 N.E.2d at 517. See notes 55-60 supra and accompanying text 
for the Wheeler test. 
96. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 631-32, 387 N.E.2d at 517-18. See notes 72-74 supra 
and accompanying text for the remedy the Wheeler court applied once a prima facie 
case of discrimination had been established and not rebutted by the prosecutor. 
97. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 611 n.l0, 387 N.E.2d at 509 n.lO. The court re­
marked that the defendants "declined to take up the Sisyphean burdens imposed on 
persons asserting a violation of equal protection under Swain." Id. 
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The Soares court's comments about the unavailability of an 
equal protection claim, combined with the Wheeler court's similar 
pessimism, raises serious questions about the status of an equal 
protection argument. At least one state supreme court, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, has begun to consider the equal protec­
tion guarantee of its constitution as affording possible protection 
and may serve as a guide to defendants in other states. 
B. Louisiana-The Possibility of Utilizing Equal Protection 
While a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to 
depart fully from the Swain standard, a series of recent concurring 
opinions has suggested a possible mode of departure. In State v. 
Brown,98 the court acknowledged the persistent plea of colleagues 
to adopt a new approach, but a majority of the court still refused to 
do SO.99 Due to the present concern with developing alternatives 
to Swain, and the possibility that the proffered alternative may 
soon be followed by courts dissatisfied with Swain, the analysis 
Brown refers to is worth evaluating. Specifically, the concurring 
opinions in State v. Eames100 and State v. Kelly101 will be ex­
plored. 
In State v. Kelly, 102 the defendant raised the issue of prejudi­
cial error due to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges 
against ten black jurors, thereby achieving an all-white jury. loa The 
Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that 
his right to an impartial jury representing a cross section of the 
community was infringed. 104 Instead, the court followed Swain, 
and finding no evidence of systematic exclusion over time, dis­
missed the defendant's claim of error as without merit. 105 
98. 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979). 
99. Id. at 754 n.4. Following Brown, the Louisiana Supreme Court reiterated 
its adherence to the principles articulated in Swain. See State v. Albert, 381 So. 2d 
424 (La. 1980); State v. Allen, 380 So. 2d 28 (La. 1980). Judge Dennis concurred in 
both cases, on the ground that prosecutorial discrimination could occur in a single 
case. State v. Albert, 381 So. 2d at 432; State v. Allen, 380 So. 2d at 32. 
100. 365 So. 2d 1361 (La. 1978). 
101. 362 So. 2d 1071 (La. 1978). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 1076. 
104. Id. at 1077. Subsequently, defendants successfully relied upon this ap­
proach in California and Massachusetts. The highest courts of both states found 
violations of the defendant's state constitutional right to a jury composed of a repre­
sentative cross section of the community. See notes 47-52 & 87-89 supra and ac­
companying text for a discussion of the approach. 
105. 362 So. 2d at 1077. 
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Judge Dennis concurred in the Kelly result but felt that the 
defendant might have been successful had he made a timely objec­
tion at trial to the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremp­
tories. 10S Judge Dennis suggested that such action on the part of 
the prosecutor was in violation of article I, section 3 of the 
Louisiana Constitution. 107 Subsequently, in State v. Eames, 108 the 
defendant made timely objections to the prosecutor's exercise of 
peremptories to exclude all but one of the black veniremen. 109 
Judge Dennis, joined by two of his colleagues, renewed his 
discussion of the rights he felt were violated when the prosecutor 
used his peremptories in such a manner. 
The Eames concurrence asserted that the Louisiana Constitu­
tion, in guaranteeing the right to equal protection and human dig­
nity, absolutely forbids prosecutorial action that discriminates 
against a person on the basis of race or religion. 110 This absolute 
prohibition under the Louisiana Constitution contrasts sharply with 
the Swain analysis of the equal protection clause of the United 
States Constitution, which would find no violation of equal protec­
tion by the exercise of peremptories in a single case to exclude 
members of a racial group.ll1 The concurring judges in Eames ar­
gued that the presumption of prosecutorial propriety set forth in 
Swain is unjustified if there is "substantial evidence [of] ... exclu­
sion of jurors because of race. "112 Thus, once it is shown that the 
prosecution has exercised "a disproportionate number of challenges 
against members of one race[,] ... a prima facie case of discrimi­
nation because of race has been established. . . . "113 At this point, 
as in the Wheeler and Soares analysis,114 the burden shifts to 
the prosecution to show that the challenges were exercised on the 
basis of individual characteristics apart from the group affiliation. lls 
106. Id. at 1082. 
107. Id. Article I, § 3 of the Louisiana Constitution sets forth the right to indi­
vidual human dignity: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. 
No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, 
or affiliations...." LA. CONST. art. I, § 3. See also Hargrave, The Declaration of 
Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,35 LA. L. REV. 1,8 (1974). 
108. 365 So. 2d at 1361. 
109. Id. at 1365. 

1l0. Id. at 1368-69. 

111. See notes 33 & 34-36 supra and accompanying text. 
112. 365 So. 2d at 1369. 
113. Id. at 1370. See also text accompanying notes 132-35 infra. 
114. See notes 72, 73 & 96 supra and accompanying text. 
115. 365 So. 2d at 1370. 
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The essential distinction between the Louisiana standard advo­
cated by Judge Dennis and that adopted in Massachusetts and 
California is in the scope of the protection afforded the defendant. 
The Wheeler and Soares courts expressed concern about, and fash­
ioned a remedy to eliminate, the use of peremptory challenges by 
prosecutors on the basis of any cognizable group membership. The 
method advocated in the Eames concurrence extends only to the 
use of peremptories by prosecutors to eliminate members of racial 
groups from the jury.116 Nevertheless, the approach articulated in 
Kelly and Eames provides an important starting point for defend­
ants interested in attacking prosecutorial abuse of peremptories. 
Although the right to equal protection discussed in these cases ap­
pears to extend "beyond the decisional law construing the Four­
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,"117 it serves 
to highlight the importance of the right to equal protection and the 
need for federal protection of that right in the context of the jury 
challenge stage of trial proceedings. 
VII. BEYOND STATE CONSTITUTIONS-­

FASHIONING A FEDERAL REMEDY 

Individual defendants in California, Louisiana, and Massa­
chusetts may have an available state-created remedy for 
prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges; however, the broad 
prospect of continued abuse of peremptory challenges invites spec­
ulation as to how defendants may be provided with a constitutional 
avenue of protection that will surmount the obstacles created by 
Swain. In the Eames concurrence, Judge Dennis· suggests an 
alternative. U8 He argues that the Swain standard should become 
inapplicable when the prosecutor admits to using his peremptory 
challenges to exclude members of a racial or ethnic group without 
a legitimate specific bias justification. 119 Once the prosecutor 
makes this admission, a prima facie case of violation of equal pro­
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1369. 
118. Id. at 1372. 
119. Id. But see State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979). The Louisiana 
Supreme Court found Swain applicable and its burden met where a single prosecu­
tor testified at an evidentiary hearing that he had consistently excluded blacks from 
juries by the use of peremptory challenges "solely on the basis of race and without 
examination as to the individual's particular qualifications or predilections." Id. at 
1164. Similarly, in United States v. Danzey, 476 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the 
district court stated that the prosecutor's motive is irrelevant unless there is a show­
ing of systematic exclusion over time. Id. at 1067. 
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tection under the fourteenth amendment is established. 120 Addi­
tionally, the prosecutor's admission need not be a bold statement 
of purpose. When the prosecutor fails to provide a good faith justi­
fication for the challenged exercise of his peremptories against 
members of a racial group, an admission may be found. 121 The 
burden would then shift to the government to show that the exer­
cise of each peremptory challenge by the prosecutor was based 
upon permissible specific bias grounds. 
It is rare, however, that a prosecutor will be called upon to 
admit in a judicial proceeding that his exercise of peremptory chal­
lenges against potential jurors was motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose. Rather, the prosecutor normally exercises his peremp­
tories without comment as to the basis for the exclusion and with­
out subsequent judicial inquiry. 122 The prosecutor's use of peremp­
tory challenges should be presumed to be proper. 123 Nevertheless, 
when a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges results in 
the exclusion of a disproportionate number of individuals of a 
single discrete group affiliation from service on a particular jury, a 
defendant may wish to challenge the prosecutor's actions as dis­
criminatory. Swain and its progeny indicate that a defendant must 
prove systematic exclusion of the group by prosecutors in the par­
ticular trial court system, over an extended period of time, in order 
to prevai1. 124 An alternative analysis, however, seems to be sug­
gested by the United States Supreme Court's discussions of invidi­
ous discrimination violative of the equal protection components of 
the fourteenth and fifth amendments. 
In Washington v. Davis, 125 the United States Supreme Court 
identified the central purpose of the equal protection clause as "the 
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of 
race. "126 When a defenda •.t believes that the prosecutor in his case 
120. 365 So. 2d at 1372. At least one federal court has expressed concern that if 
a prosecutor were required to testify as to his motive for exercising his peremptories 
in a particular case against individuals of a particular racial group, the prosecutor 
might then be criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1976) for excluding a quali­
fied citizen from jury service on account of race. United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 
1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1971). 
121. 365 So. 2d at 1372. 
122. See note 1 supra for a discussion of the characteristics of peremptory chal­
lenges, as well as a discussion of chailenges for cause. 
123. See text accompanying note 32 supra. 
124. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra. 
125. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
126. ld. at 239. 
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has exercised peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, 
thereby excluding members of a particular racial group, the equal 
protection clause, consonant with its essential purpose, ought to be 
available to vindicate the defendant's rights. The Supreme Court 
has stated that "the fact that a particular jury ... does not statisti­
cally reflect the racial composition of the community does not in it­
self make out an invidious discrimination forbidden by the [Equal 
Protection] Clause. "127 Rather, the Court has required a showing 
of purposeful discrimination. 128 
Systematic exclusion should be but one method of proving 
purposeful discrimination. Additionally, when a defendant proves 
that the prosecutor's actions had a disproportionate impact on jury 
composition, and he can point to additional factors concerning the 
selection of the jury that give rise to an inference of intentional dis­
crimination, a violation of the equal protection clause should be es­
tablished. In Davis, the Court pointed out that "an invidious dis­
criminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the 
relevant facts"129 including the fact that the official act had a dis­
proportionate impact on one race. 130 The Davis Court discussed 
juror selection cases at length131 and acknowledged that discrimi­
natory impact "may, for all practical purposes demonstrate uncon­
stitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is 
very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds. "132 Although the 
Court was relying on cases concerning the exclusion of jurors from 
grand and petit juries by operation of jury selection systems, it is 
127. [d. See also text accompanying notes 79 & 80 supra. 
128. [d. See also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court stated that "[s]ometimes a clear 
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the 
state action .... But such cases are rare. Absent [such] a pattern, ... impact alone 
is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence." [d. at 266. In a 
footnote, the Court noted that a "single invidiously discriminatory act ... would not 
necessarily be immunized [from a challenge of discrimination] by the absence of 
such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions." [d. at n.14. 
129. 426 U.S. at 242. 
130. [d. 
131. The Court's discussion of the jury selection cases begins with Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), and includes Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 
625 (1972), Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 
320 (1970), Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967), Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 
584 (1958), Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953), Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 
(1950), Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947), Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 
(1945), and Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942). Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 
239-42. 
132. 426 U.S. at 242. 
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arguable that the same rationale should apply to the exclusion of 
jurors from the petit jury by the prosecutor's exercise of peremp­
tory challenges. Thus, when the prosecutor's exercise of his 
peremptories results in the exclusion of all or nearly all individuals 
of a particular racial or ethnic group from the jury panel and the 
discriminatory impact is very difficult to explain on grounds 
unrelated to the discrete group affiliation, an unconstitutional exer­
cise of the challenges might be found. 
In its discussion of the jury selection cases, the Davis Court 
also indicated that a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose 
might be proven by the absence, or the severely disproportionate 
exclusion, of blacks from a particular jury,133 combined with 
nonneutral selection criteria or procedures. 134 One such nonneutral 
factor, a defendant might argue, is the use of peremptory chal­
lenges to exclude all, or nearly all, individuals of a particular dis­
crete group affiliation on general, rather than specific, bias 
grounds. The number of peremptory challenges the prosecutor 
used, the group affiliations of those excused, the proportionate ex­
ercise of challenges against group and nongroup members, the 
composition of the resultant panel, as well as the proportionate 
representation of group and nongroup members in the community 
at large might be relevant factors demonstrating the nonneutral 
character of a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges in a 
particular case. 
Once a defendant established a prima facie case of discrimina­
tory purpose, the burden of proof would shift to the prosecutor to 
rebut the presumption of discriminatory action. The Supreme 
Court has suggested that the government might refute a presump­
tion of discrimination "by showing that permissible racially neutral 
selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochro­
matic result. "135 The prosecutor might meet this burden by coming 
forward and identifying the specific bias reasons for excluding each 
of the group members, thereby demonstrating that it was not the 
common group affiliation that led to the exclusions and that the re­
sulting jury panel was not purposefully disproportionate in its com­
position. If the prosecutor is unwilling or unable to identify specific 
133. [d. at 241. 
134. [d. For example, the Court pointed out that a prima facie case of discrimi­
natory purpose was presented when the jury commissioners were not informed of el­
igible black jurors in Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942), and blacks were absent from 
the particular jury. 426 U.S. at 241. 
135. 426 U.S. at 241. 
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bias reasons for the exclusion of each of the individuals 
peremptorily challenged, then a violation of the equal protection 
clause may be established. Since the jury panel so selected would 
be the result of invidious discrimination by the prosecutor, it 
would appear proper to follow the suggestion of People v. 
Wheeler136 by beginning jury selection again.137 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Com­
monwealth v. Soares 138 contains sufficient information about the 
composition of the jury venire, the exercise of peremptory chal­
lenges by the prosecutor, and the resulting jury paneP39 to enable 
application of the equal protection analysis just suggested. In 
Soares two black defendants were charged with the murder of a 
white victim. The jury that tried and convicted the defendants in­
cluded only one black member. 140 The prosecutor had exercised 
forty-four peremptory challenges, excluding twelve of the thirteen 
blacks on the venire and thirty-two of the ninety-four whites on the 
venire. 141 The court pointed out that "Through his use of these 
[peremptory] challenges, ... [the prosecutor] excluded ninety-two 
percent of the available black jurors, and only thirty-four per cent 
of the available white jurors. "142 The defendants in Soares might 
have argued that the prosecutor had used his peremptory chal­
lenges in order to purposefully exclude blacks from the jury. Fur­
ther, the combination of the exclusion of almost all blacks from the 
jury and the use of the peremptory challenges in a nonneutral 
manner would constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. 
Once the defendants had set forth a prima facie case of discrimina­
tory action by the prosecutor, the government would have the bur­
den of proving that the prosecutor's exercise of his peremptories 
was based on permissible neutral criteria, rather than on the fact of 
group affiliation. 143 
The utility of such an equal protection approach is unclear at 
present. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor state su­
preme courts have used this mode of analysis in determining the 
136. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 258, 583 P.2d at 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 890. 
137. See text accompanying note 74 supra. 
138. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 593, 387 N.E.2d at 499. 
139. See generally text accompanying notes 87-97 supra. 
140. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 607-08, 387 N .E.2d at 508. See also note 89 supra. 
141. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 608, 387 N.E.2d at 508. 
142. ld. 
143. ld. at 630,387 N.E.2d at 517. 
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constitutionality of a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory chal­
lenges. Nonetheless, this alternative may prove valuable in the fu­
ture. 
Another alternative for defendants is to continue to press for a 
reevaluation of the representative cross-section rule and its applica­
bility to the actual jury panel. Although it is clear that the Court 
in Taylor rejected the mirror-image concept of petit jury composi­
tion,144 the representative cross-section rule still may extend to the 
jury panel. The Supreme Court has never indicated that Duncan v. 
Louisiana145 and Taylor cannot be so extended. If more state 
courts recognize the importance of the representative cross-section 
rule to jury composition at the final stage of jury selection, the Su­
preme Court might be willing to reevaluate and expand its holding 
in Taylor. 
In addition to suggesting possible constitutional routes of chal­
lenge for defendants, it is important to recognize that legislative 
change may in fact be the only way to protect defendants 
nationwide from prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges. 
Two alternatives are worthy of consideration. 
Some commentators have argued that the peremptory chal­
lenge should be abolished. 146 It is felt that the potential and actual 
discriminatory application and abuse is too great to permit the con­
tinued exercise of peremptories. This belief is supported by the 
current failure of the courts to provide sufficient protection for de­
fendants in the criminal process from prosecutorial manipulation of 
jury panels. The desire and necessity for a fair trial by an impartial 
jury still could be insured through the random selection of the jury 
venire and the continued use of statutory excuses and challenges 
for cause. Nevertheless, given the underlying purposes of the per­
emptory challenge,147 and its continued approval by the courts, 148 
abolition seems unlikely at present. 
A second legislative solution would be to eliminate the statu­
tory grant of peremptory challenges to the prosecution while re­
taining the right for the defense. 149 Considering the historical de­
144. See notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text. 
145. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
146. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 167-68. Brown, McGuire, & Winters, supra 
note 38, at 234-35. 
147. See notes 3 & 4 supra and accompanying text for Blackstone's explanation 
of the underlying purposes. 
148. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text. 
149. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 167. 
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velopment of peremptory challenges,150 this approach may seem 
attractive. The prosecution was without the right during much of 
the time that our common law and statutory law were developing. 
The rationale for extending the right to the prosecution, to allow 
the elimination of potential jurors unfairly biased against acquittal, 
while valid, may not stand up to the increasing need for protection 
of the defendant's constitutionally protected right to a fair trial by 
an impartial jury. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The peremptory challenge has been recognized as an essential 
mechanism for assuring an impartial jury in a particular trial. The 
challenges also have been the subject of abuse by prosecutors who 
exercise their peremptories to exclude members of discrete groups 
from petit juries solely on the basis of that membership. This dis­
criminatory use of peremptory challenges may produce a jury 
biased in favor of conviction. The prosecutor's actions arguably im­
pinge on the defendant's rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury 
and to equal protection under the laws. Yet the future of the per­
emptory challenge and of the protection of the criminal defendant's 
rights remains uncertain. 
In Swain, the United States Supreme Court established the 
presumption that prosecutors' peremptory challenges were exer­
cised fairly so as to secure an impartial jury. To overcome this pre­
sumption, defendants are faced with an insurmountable burden of 
proof: defendants must show -extensive, systematic, and complete 
exclusion of a particular racial or ethnic group from juries over an 
extended period of time. Inroads are being made into the Swain 
barrier, as evidenced by the opinions of a few state courts, yet the 
United States Supreme Court has essentially remained silent on 
this issue for fifteen years. It is unknown at present whether the 
United States Supreme Court or additional state courts will follow 
the examples of Wheeler and Soares. These two cases prohibit per­
emptory challenges on general bias grounds and place a limitation 
on their use, thus ending prosecutors' exclusion of discrete groups 
from particular jury panels in contravention of the right to a fair 
trial by an impartial jury. Further, the suggestion of an equal pro­
tection analysis has not been adopted by the courts in their evalua­
tions of prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges. 
150. See notes 9-24 supra and accompanying text. 
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The potential for, and reality of, prosecutorial abuse of per­
emptory challenges makes it essential that the courts reevaluate 
their approaches to defendants' claims of prosecutorial abuse of 
peremptory challenges. Defendants in criminal trials should be af­
forded the protection effectively denied them under Swain. 
Susan L. Larky 
